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Marcel Wissenburg2
1 Introduction
Aristotle was not too clear when it came to defining which of the creative pursuits in life would be 
most valuable. At times, he seems to have argued in support of a life of reflection and philosophy, but 
his Ethics and Politics suggest that the shaping and protection of the community’s political structure 
should be rated higher. Either way, political philosophy rates very high among the activities that 
distinguish humanity from birds, bees and beasts of burden, and if political philosophy is so crucial in 
defining humanity or civilization, John Borden Rawls (1921-2002) must surely count as one of the 
most ‘human’ human beings of the 20th Century. 
In a world where sufficient work and labour, i.e., production and reproduction, or in other words the 
everyday struggle for survival, are still - as they will always be -  the insecure and extremely 
vulnerable necessary conditions preceding any room for free time, free thinking and creativity, it is not 
surprising that even Rawls’ fame, let alone knowledge of his work, is distributed fairly unequally over 
society. It is almost certain that the majority of the general public had never heard of him before they 
picked up the news of his death (if they did in the first place), and it is not unlikely that the same 
applies to most academics. Had Aristotle defined a successful life as one in which one’s creativity 
actually bears fruit and shapes society, then Rawls’ life could easily be called a failure - he left no 
Sicily behind, shaped in accordance with his teachings, there is no international revolutionary 
Rawlsian movement, and even social scientists who try to adapt his ideas to more ‘practical’ issues 
often fail to understand it. Yet he has had and still has an impact; it all depends on how impact is 
measured.
Opinions are divided as to what exactly was his magnum opus – almost everyone will say that it was A 
Theory of Justice, published in 1971, but his next book, Political Liberalism, published in 1993, is 
now slowly beginning to gain an almost equal standing in political philosophy. His books are 
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complicated and easily misinterpreted, and they get more complicated, although better interpretable, 
each time one reads them. Also, the more one reads, the more one wants to disagree with him, and yet 
at the same time it becomes more and more difficult to do so. By that I do not mean to say that Rawls 
is always right – what I mean is that it takes a lot more than a superficial reading of the Theory of  
Justice, Political Liberalism, The Law of Peoples (1999), Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 
(2000) and so on, to disagree with him on good grounds.
Rawls’ work became a point of reference for Anglo-Saxon political and moral philosophers almost 
immediately after his first book, A Theory of Justice, was published in 1971. From there, his influence 
can be traced through concepts, terminology and research issues to empirical disciplines like 
economics, political science, sociology and social psychology, and from there to policy makers; a 
second line of influence runs from political theory to political think tanks, authors of party manifestos 
and speech writers, down to politicians and statesmen. In this sense, John Rawls has at least changed 
the face, and possibly more of the anatomy, of the liberal democratic society - for it is the latter of 
which he was the greatest champion.
Rawls became famous - if a word like that may be used in this context - as a liberal egalitarian (see 
e.g. Kymlicka 2000), a philosophical liberal who defends a form of social equality. Although he 
explicitly preferred what he called a ‘property-owning democracy’ to a welfare state - by which he 
seems to have meant the ideal-type of the Swedish model - few introductory courses in political 
philosophy and even politics will fail to begin by introducing him as the ultimate advocate of  the 
welfare state, in opposition to his friend, colleague and one-time neighbour Robert Nozick, who is 
usually presented  (and in fact equally misrepresented) as the archetypical apologist for free trade and 
neo-liberalism.
My aim in this article is to cast doubt on this idea. I shall argue that Rawls is far less egalitarian than 
he is usually taken to be, and far more liberal - though like Nozick, he remains anything but a neo-
liberal.
Few scholars doubt that Rawls intended to defend a combination of liberalism and egalitarianism, few 
also doubt that Rawls tried to do this in a far more radical way than liberals had done up to then. Ever 
since the first time the term was used in a political context, probably shortly after the French 
Revolution, liberalism defined itself as combining liberty with equality. Since these two concepts are 
at the most fundamental level mutually exclusive - liberty implies room for difference, equality 
defines the absence of difference - each of the two is applied to distinct spheres, and/or one always 
takes precedence over the other. Thus, we might call stoicism an intellectual forerunner of liberalism 
in that it affirmed the fundamental equality of humans in their capacity for intellectual liberty, while 
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virtually unquestioningly accepting liberty in all non-intellectual spheres of life, from politics and 
economics to the family and the body. It thereby tolerated forms of inequality up to and including 
slavery and torture, and thereby also accepted inequality of the actual opportunity to develop these 
equally distributed intellectual faculties. The direct (16th to 18th Century) forerunners of liberalism 
already defended social and legal liberty rather than virtual liberty for the intellect only: they argued 
for tolerance first towards different forms of Christianity, then towards religion in general, then 
conviction, then ethics, finally, as John Stuart Mill did, even embracing moral diversity as 
instrumentally good in the pursuit of emancipation and autonomy.
In doing so, liberalism split off the sphere of politics from the realm of fate, adding to intellectual 
liberty the equal liberty to rethink and reshape the structure of the polis, yet leaving the social and 
economic basis of life untouched. Rawls (1971) referred to this as the Napoleonic interpretation of 
equal opportunity: careers are open to talents regardless of social background, but nothing is done to 
abate the unequal influence of social background itself. To do that, to allow each individual to develop 
his or her talents before entering the social rat race, would be to create fair equality of opportunity - 
one of Rawls’ explicit aims.
Few then question that Rawls intended to defend a more radically egalitarian liberalism - those who 
do, do not really care about intentions but look for discrepancies between expressed goals, preferred 
means and expected results instead. I hope to show that intentions are nonetheless relevant to a 
complete understanding of Rawls’ work, and thereby to understanding how realistic Rawls’ goals are 
in the first place.
Before I can present my argument, it is necessary to explain in which types of critique I am not 
interested here - this without denying their relevance. Hence, I shall first briefly present Rawls’ core 
arguments for those unfamiliar with them (Section 2), thereby explaining what exactly is meant when 
Rawls’ theory is characterized as liberal egalitarian.  I then move on (in Section 3) to Rawls’ attempt 
to answer those critics who argued that he merely preached to the choir: his theory of justice as 
fairness would appeal only to those who are already at heart liberals, who cherish liberty, 
emancipation and autonomy. It is here, I argue, that a previously undetected tension between his 
liberalism and his egalitarianism comes to light. 
On the one hand, Rawls supports not only the ideal of social equality but also that of equal 
justification: the rules governing the social order in which we live ought to be justifiable, at least in 
principle, to each and every free and reasonable human being. No one, at least no free and reasonable 
person, ought to have a cause to think of them as arbitrary or tyrannical. Yet, on the other hand, he 
advances an ideal of freedom, or more precisely autonomy, that only a very special kind of human 
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being, an elite among us, can live up to. Since only autonomous individuals can truly and honestly 
assent to Rawls’ rules for social co-operation, he has failed, I conclude (in Section 4), to overcome the 
oldest problem of liberalism – the problem that only an elite can enjoy the fruits of the liberal good 
life. Then again, I do believe that he has succeeded in redefining the question in a very fruitful way – 
so much so, that I think we should accept the elitist consequences.
2 The Original Theory of Justice
Rawls exists almost entirely as a theory and almost not as a human being – even more so, of course, 
now that he is dead. In theory, a theory exists independent of the person: it is true or false, right or 
wrong, regardless of any context of discovery. The validity and relevance of its most fundamental 
premises ought to be universal and eternal.3 And yet it is always interesting to ask where ideas come 
from – how eternal truths or would-be eternal truths are discovered. It helps us to learn to understand 
how reason really works and where its limits might lie.4 
So Rawls’ biography is interesting, at least potentially – and, as I will show, also actually. Rawls was 
born as John Borden Rawls on February 21, 1921, in Baltimore. He was a WASP: a White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant, and from a rich family, too: his father was a tax lawyer, his mother (not a WASP by 
the way; her family’s roots lay in Germany) an active feminist. In brief, he had a typically elitist 
background as a member of the old patrician families of New England.
In most respects (but not all), his life was unremarkable, even boring. He went to good schools, then to 
a good university (Princeton), became interested in philosophy, in his last year particularly in political 
philosophy, wrote his Ph.D. and left. He started teaching philosophy at Cornell, later moved on to MIT 
and then to Harvard, where he would retire 40 years later as the James Bryant Conant University 
Professor, the highest academic position at Harvard. In 1995, two days after a large conference 
celebrating the 25th anniversary of A Theory of Justice, Rawls had the first of a long series of strokes 
that would slowly debilitate him, first interrupting his work, then stopping it (Rogers 1999). He died of 
heart failure on 24 November 2002 at his home in Lexington (Harvard Gazette, 25 November 2003).
Rawls never gave interviews (with only one known exception) and seldom opened up about his private 
life, even to his closest friends. Virtually all we know about him can be summarized in these words: he 
3 Even so-called particularistic theories like communitarianism share this appeal to universalism: what counts as 
right within a social context X defined by morality x, should be acknowledged as right within that context from 
the perspective of any morality y in any other context Y.
4 There is a second reason why an individual’s formative experiences are relevant to this article - but that will 
become clear later.
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led a very quiet, unassuming, modest life away from the maddening crowd, almost that of the classic 
academic in the ancient ivory tower. Two ‘incidents’ are know however to have changed his life – 
and, one may argue, to have inspired the formulation of the most fundamental and radical of all his 
ideas, that of the moral arbitrariness of what fate does to our lives:
“Rawls described to (Thomas, MW) Pogge the formative experience of his early life: the 
death of two of his younger brothers, both through illnesses they contracted from Rawls; the 
one from diphtheria, the other from pneumonia. These events constitute some of Rawls's 
closest shaves. Joshua Cohen says that they are reflected in A Theory of Justice in discussions 
of the "arbitrariness of fortune" and the "unmerited contingencies" of life. It was about this 
time that Rawls developed his stutter; he traces it back to his brothers' deaths.” (Rogers 1999)
It is this thought, the idea that natural differences between humans are never deserved, on which 
Rawls built everything else. Note that the assumption of the moral irrelevance of natural differences, 
which plays such a crucial role in Immanuel Kant’s contract theory as interpreted and (see below) 
imported by Rawls (cf. Rawls 1971, 2000), supports only a neutral assessment of the consequences of 
such differences as ‘not logically implied’, and not Rawls’ far more emotional judgements like 
‘underserved’, ‘unfair’ and ‘unjust’.
The Theory of Justice begins with the observation that moral pluralism is irreducible – and since we 
have no universal standard for justice, one on which we all agree, the question rises whether it is 
nonetheless possible to find common ground and define principles for the just distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social co-operation, principles on which we can all agree despite our different 
theories of the good and (consequently) our diverging plans of life. The only way towards such a 
publicly justifiable conception of justice, Rawls believes, lies in impartiality: in taking a point of view 
on society that respects all these diverging theories of the good. But real-existing humans cannot do 
that: like it or not, and try as much as we may, we will always, consciously or subconsciously, argue in 
our own favour,5 or at least based on our own limited experiences. Hence, Rawls proposes a dialogue 
between ‘our considered judgements’ on the one hand, and the so-called ‘Original Position’ on the 
other.6
We cannot be impartial, but we can imagine what it would be like to be impartial. We can translate 
these ideas into conditions under which (then hypothetically impartial) people would choose principles 
of justice, compare their judgements to ours, and draw our conclusions. We will conclude that 
5 Even the perfect altruist, whose preferences are completely defined by the preferences of one or more others, 
argues from the point of view of a specific theory of the good.
6 What follows is a simplified representation of Rawls’ so-called narrow reflective equilibrium. For a more 
detailed and balanced analysis of the reflective equilibrium methods, see Daniels (1996).
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sometimes these hypothetical people (in the ‘original position’ of impartiality) are not impartial 
enough – hence, we amend the conditions – and sometimes that our own intuitive judgements were 
wrong – hence, we amend them and turn them into ‘considered’ judgements. Then we start the process 
all over again. In due course, we will reach a so-called ‘reflective equilibrium’: our considered 
judgements conform to the judgement of imaginary people in an original position.
The conditions under which an impartial choice is possible are many – I will highlight only the most 
important condition in the present context. It is part of a series of conditions ensuring an impartial state 
of mind: the ‘veil of ignorance’. To be impartial, hence, not consciously or subconsciously guided by 
prejudice and personal advantage, we must assume that the people in the original position have no 
knowledge of who they actually are. They cannot know their age, their sex, their race, their 
nationality, their mental and physical abilities and capabilities, their economic and social position – all 
this is shrouded by the veil of ignorance. Behind this lies Rawls’ rejection of the contingencies of fate: 
the fact that nature makes one person smart, strong or male and another dumb, weak or female should 
in no way result in society making the one richer or freer or more powerful than the other – and by 
implication, no one deserves those fruits of his or her labour that he or she gained solely due to his or 
her natural advantages over others. That would not be fair – hence Rawls’ characterisation of his 
theory as ‘justice as fairness’.
Once a reflective equilibrium has been reached – Rawls does not describe in detail how this happens, 
but even the fiercest critics nowadays agree that his conclusion follows more or less7 logically from 
the premises – the people in the original position will choose two principles:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
a. Reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and
b. Attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1971/1999, p. 53)
Note that this quote is from page 53. The text is over 500 pages long – in the rest of the book, Rawls 
gives more and more detail and subtlety to his so-called ‘Two Principles’, until, in their final 
formulation, they take up a complete page (Rawls 1971/1999, p. 266). He also specifies how the 
original position can be adapted to translate the Two Principles into ideal constitutions against which 
7 This is not to say that the premises on which Rawls’ probably valid argument are based are themselves beyond 
debate. One of Rawls’ most controversial premises illustrates this: the maximin principle demands that 
individuals choosing between constitutions under conditions of uncertainty even with regard to chances will 
choose that constitution under which they would, being worst off (=min) in that society, still be best off (=maxi) 
as compared to other constitutions. Maximin betrays an undefended, even debatable, moral attitude towards risks 
(cf. Wissenburg 1999). 
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real societies can be assessed, then into ideal laws and finally into ideal judges – to name only one of 
dozens of extensions and modifications he makes.8 All this does not need to concern us here, since 
what I am interested in here is not the conclusions, but the premises of Rawls’ theory, and one in 
particular: that moral pluralism is a good thing.
The Two Principles neatly summarize what makes Rawls both a liberal and an egalitarian. He is 
liberal in his toleration, even promotion of a diversity of theories of the good and a diversity of life-
styles; he is an egalitarian in wishing the right thereto to be distributed equally, and in wishing that the 
material conditions for the exercise of that right be distributed equally - at least in principle. lt is the 
latter clause, referring to Principle 2a (the so-called Difference Principle), that has made some of his 
critics argue that Rawls fails, in the final instance, to unite liberalism and egalitarianism. As Gerald 
Cohen observed (e.g. Cohen 1995), the Difference Principle may be invoked by a society wishing to 
enslave a socially ‘useful’ doctor who would rather explore his far more limited but personally much 
more enjoyed talents as a tennis player; it may also be invoked by that same doctor to extract an 
unnecessarily huge salary from society in return for services he could also perform for less. The 
Difference Principle, a principle of social efficiency rather than social justice, would sacrifice either 
individual liberty to social uniformity, or sacrifice the widest possible access to a life worth living to 
greed.9
Cohen's critique is exemplary of the mainstream of Rawls critique: it focuses on the potential 
inadequacy of either the arguments in support of the Two Principles themselves or of the possible 
operationalization thereof. It is obviously a valid and valuable form of critique, but the course 1 wish 
to pursue here is a different one: in which sense was it really Rawls' intention to be an egalitarian?
3 A problem, the fix and further problems
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice took off slowly – the first serious book reviews that I have discovered date 
from 1973, two years after the initial publication – but it gained ground quickly. Just four years later, 
Robert Nozick, who also died in 2002, wrote:
8 lt is here that social scientists often miss the point of Rawls' theory by assessing practices by their direct fit with 
the Two Principles, rather than by first contextualizing the latter using what Rawls calls the Four-Stage 
Sequence.  Practices may satisfy the Two Principles in general (say, welfare benefits for victims of work-related 
stress) yet fail to take into account contextual factors that would make an alternative practice (the reduction of 
stress at work) a preferable course of action; research affirming a fit between the Two Principles and the first 
practice would generate a false positive.  Likewise, false negatives are possible when a practice that does not 
confirm straightforwardly to the Two Principles is, under those specific circumstances, the best one can do to 
create an environment in which the Two Principles can be satisfied.
9 For further discussion of and more recent material on the practical implications the Difference Principle, see 
Chambers 2006.
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‘A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and 
moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. It 
is a fountain of illuminating ideas, integrated together into a lovely whole. Political 
philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not. (…) And it is 
impossible to finish his book without a new and inspiring vision of what a moral theory may 
attempt to do and unite; of how beautiful a whole theory can be.’ (Nozick 1974, p. 183)
Unlike Nozick and scarcely more than a dozen others, virtually all of Rawls’ commentators stopped 
short of developing a truly alternative theory, instead limiting themselves to critiques of major and 
minor aspects of A Theory of Justice. The number of articles and books on Rawls’ theory grew 
explosively, as did, by implication, the number of areas of debate in which Rawls began to dominate 
(from law and war to feminism and environment – see e.g. Barry and Wissenburg, 2001), and the 
same is true of the number of real and imagined problems perceived in the theory. One of these 
became the Leitmotiv of Rawls' next book, Political Liberalism.
The theory of justice as fairness is supposed to be justifiable in the eyes of all free and reasonable 
human beings. It offers a home in which, a common ground on which, they can live together, 
peacefully tolerating each other’s diverging theories of the good, peacefully living their separate lives 
according to the prescripts of those theories. All it requires is that we unanimously accept the 
conditions of the original position and the reasoning leading from the original position to the 
principles of justice. But among these conditions is a theory of the good – a ‘thin’ theory, i.e., a very 
limited and very superficial theory of the good, but a theory of the good nevertheless. Worse, it is a 
liberal theory of the good: it assumes that life is about emancipation, about recognizing and embracing 
freedom of choice, freedom of opinion, and most importantly, it 
‘…rested on a Kantian version of a secular liberal outlook, according to which each of us has 
a right and a duty to actively search out our own good from the alternatives available to us.’ 
(Rogers 1999). 
A theory like that can be at odds – and in fact often is – with almost every other theory of the good, 
and one cannot serve two masters: one’s own ‘thick’ theory of the good and Rawls’ ‘thin’ theory. As 
Rawls himself later observed (Rawls 1993), orthodox interpretations of many religions demand an act 
of faith or an experience of grace, i.e. submission to precepts rather than argumentative persuasion of 
their sensibility. To name examples was less risky in 1993 than it is today: Rawls uses orthodox 
Catholicism and Judaism as illustrations, not afraid of accusations of antipapism or anti-Semitism; 
8
whether he would today also mention Islam (one translation of the word being ‘submission’) can only 
be guessed.
Rawls took up the problem of ‘preaching to the choir’ in Political Liberalism, admitting that his 
original theory could never be as universal as he initially claimed: one of the basic arguments, the thin 
theory of the good, could only convince the already converted, i.e., liberals. Rather than giving up 
altogether and throwing away the baby with the bath water, he started to look for a new justification, 
one that would appeal to reasonable non-liberals as well. He found this in the notion of an overlapping 
consensus. Reasonable doctrines of the good life, he argued, may not agree on deep moral questions, 
on whether or not the gods exist and what they want from us, or on whether freedom of choice is good 
or a curse – but they can have overlapping values in the realm of politics, values like respect for life 
and for others, and reciprocity. From there on, Rawls argues that this overlapping consensus implies 
almost everything he said the original position implied – with a few absolutely minor changes to 
satisfy other critics.
At this point, the critic has two options. One is to point out that the overlapping consensus Rawls talks 
about still excludes some parties. One cannot ‘join’ the overlapping consensus if one is not reasonable, 
that is, if one does not first accept what Rawls calls ‘the burdens of judgement’ or burdens of reason 
(Rawls 1993: 56 ff.), criteria for what propositions can and cannot be defended in a public debate. To 
be convinced by Rawls thus still presumes that one shares certain deeper moral ideas or is at least the 
tiniest whiff sceptical about one’s own theory of the good. That (i.e., scepticism) may be a justifiable 
position (or not) but it is certainly one that some groups in our world reject – with the fundamentalist 
faithful at the forefront.
One possible critique then argues that Rawls does not solve all the problems of the world, or at least 
not all the important ones. This is probably true, but insufficient grounds to refute the theory. A more 
realistic and promising line of critique would argue that once more, Rawls fails and must fail to 
convince all those he claims he can convince. More people are excluded than fundamentalists, 
terrorists, racial bigots, and others who – but that is a different subject – are not worthy of inclusion in 
the first place.
To develop this line of critique, we must first look in more detail at what the idea of an overlapping 
consensus entails. First of all, it implies that there must be moral pluralism:
(1) The existence of a plurality of religious and other doctrines giving 'meaning', 'purpose', 
'goals' or 'criteria' for the good life: a superset A of sets of ideas An: {A1, A2, …An}.
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It also implies that:
(2) Within each of these sets, a set of ideas B is shared or supported by all doctrines: 
within every An, there is a subset Bn that is identical to the subset Bm of any other doctrine 
Am.
(3) The limits of public reason are recognized: the doctrines A are 'reasonable doctrines', 
elements of the doctrines that do not meet these limits cannot and will not be defended in 
a public debate as ‘reasonable ideas’ (cf. Rawls 1993).
The implication of these three ideas is that we have to distinguish, at least theoretically, between 
several elements of these doctrines A:
(4) Set A {A1, A2….An} is split between 
(4.1) The set A' {A'1, A'2, … A'n} that falls within the limits of public reason; and 
(4.2) The set A'' {A''1, A''2,…A''n} of ideas that are not covered by those same limits; 
hence:
(5) The set B is also split between set B', containing ‘reasonable’ ideas shared by all, and 
set B'', containing ‘unreasonable’ ideas shared by all (though either set may be empty, of 
course).
Hence,
(6) Set A'' and ideas in set B'' are thereby limited to the private sphere, and
(7) Set A', through public debate, is limited to the set B' that can shape the public sphere: 
B’ is the ‘real’ overlapping consensus.
So far, so good – this is all pure logic, there is no problem here except when, in practice, the set B’ 
turns out to be an empty set. Let us trust Rawls on this and assume that reasonable people do indeed 
share at least, say, the idea of mutual respect for other reasonable people.
Limiting set A to A’, the set of reasonable (parts of) doctrines, is a defensible move: there can, by 
definition, be no rational debate with those who reject reason. Defining the exact limits of public 
reason itself is a tricky business, but it is not crucial to the argument: however defined, it always 
implies the existence of sets A’ and A”, B’ and B”. Of course there can still be practical conflicts 
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between the (consequences of) actions prescribed by any theory A (particularly A”) and B (B’), but 
that does not undermine the case for the existence of an overlapping consensus B’. The cause of the 
incompatibility of the prescripts of an overlapping consensus and one’s private doctrine of the good 
must, logically, be consequences of contradictions within one’s particular faith: it is Ax, then, that 
suffers from an internal contradiction. Finally, it is difficult to reject the first assumption of the theory, 
the existence of a plurality of moral and other doctrines. Not only does the real world contradict this 
(an argument based on contingent facts that is, rightly, seldom relevant in philosophy) – but if no 
doctrines A existed, or if only one doctrine A existed shared in every detail by every human being, 
then no one would lead a meaningful life, or have any reason for acting in any specific way. Humans 
would be degraded to, in the first case, unguided missiles or animals, and in the second to machines.
Yet there is trouble in paradise. To have a doctrine or theory of the good life, more is required than 
simply a human body. It requires that the body be imprinted with self-consciousness and the (perhaps 
misguided) idea of freedom of choice. In other words, one has to lead a consciously lived life, not run 
on instinct or on autopilot. It also requires that one takes up one’s responsibility, i.e. that one attempts 
to order one's life (or let it be ordered). A consciously lived and guided life requires a process of 
reflection, both public and private, on one’s actions and ideas. It requires the kind of physical and 
mental constitution that allows (or even incites) reflection, and it requires a reason for reflection: 
formative experiences. And here’s the rub.
4 Failure and success
A just social order (at least, a Rawlsian one) is possible only where an overlapping consensus exists 
between the doctrines of people who actively reflect on their lives and doctrines. Under all other 
constellations, whatever overlapping consensus exists is based on the accidental coincidence of not 
truly ‘believed’ doctrines10 – i.e., there are no reasons to believe what one believes, nor to believe in 
the public good as defined by the overlapping consensus. But to have a conviction and not just an 
opinion, more is needed than the sheer presence of a random set of normative ideas in the mind: 
something that forms one’s conviction, that transforms given data into a doctrine – in other words, a 
real formative experience - and what is more, one that one has successfully borne. By ‘formative 
experience’ I do not necessarily mean that one’s brothers have to die before one can become a moral 
person – but I do mean something quite like that: an experience so profound that it forces one to define 
who one is, what goals one has, what one can hope for, by what standards one would judge one’s life 
to have been successful on one’s deathbed. Such a formative experience can be the death of a loved 
one or a near-death experience (like an academic text) – but it can just as well be a poem that shakes 
10 I do realize that this implies an unconventional definition of ‘true belief’.
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one’s world, a lecturer or a love, or a random road sign (further on this, see Wissenburg 1999). The 
point is: for Rawls, an unexamined life is not only a lost opportunity (Nozick 1989); it is a life lost, a 
life that makes one morally ‘undead’. Grounding or formative experiences are a prerequisite for such 
an examined life, although not a guarantee.  For one, too many such experiences - the classics war, 
pestilence, famine and death spring to mind - will unsettle even the strongest mind; for another, it 
takes a minimal degree of intelligence, sensitivity and mental stability to recognize a formative 
experience when it presents itself, not to mention deal with it accordingly and appropriately.
Rawls’ theory is egalitarian in virtually all its consequences: he argues for taxes and redistribution to 
correct the injustices of social mechanisms that create undeserved material inequality, both within 
societies and globally; he argues for the strongest possible form of political equality for all and for the 
strongest possible form of equal opportunity in life (short of genetic modification) - and he argues that 
a good theory of the just society ought to be, at least in principle, equally convincing and equally 
comprehensible for all. All these constitute necessary conditions for an ‘even fairer’ equality of 
opportunity - not just a fair opportunity to develop one’s talents to participate in society, but even one 
to experience, work through and survive enough yet not too many formative experiences. They are 
necessary conditions; they are not sufficient.
Rawls may be egalitarian, but on the other hand he is also a liberal - not only in the sense in which the 
term is understood in the USA, as a left-wing Democrat, but also in the classical philosophical sense: 
an emancipator and a champion of tolerance and diversity. Rawls believes that there is no one final 
convincing truth in ethics, at least not one that justifies oppression of or discrimination against 
dissenting opinions.  In fact, he believes, for much the same reasons as John Stuart Mill, that the 
reality of moral pluralism is a good thing. To have a choice between different systems of belief, 
different ethics, different ‘theories of the good’, as Rawls calls them, is a necessary condition for 
human autonomy. Autonomy is more and even something else than freedom from fate or natural law. 
For one, it refers to intellectual liberty, specifically to the intellectual and moral ability to individually 
create, assess and revise the rules according to which and/or goals for which one lives. More 
importantly for us, autonomy also brings with it responsibility: the individual’s very own, very 
personal responsibility to reflect on what he or she wants and rejects and dreams - and does. 
Autonomy makes one responsible for the formation of one’s personality and for one’s actions. 
Without autonomy no human can act ethically, no one can be good - or evil, for that matter.
The price of autonomy is high, nevertheless: the demand that we lead an examined life, that we have 
real convictions, is an emancipating as much as an exclusionary notion. There seems to be no room in 
the overlapping consensus for the superficial, floating and ever-changing will-o’-the-wisp beliefs of - 
let us be blunt here - the unreflective masses, the easily exited and the nervously inclined. If this 
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conclusion is correct, if indeed it is implied by Rawls’ theory of an overlapping consensus, we must 
also accept the corollary that being born and raised in a community or obtaining a membership card in 
any other way is not enough to be able to fully function as a citizen, nor sufficient grounds for a polity 
to count one’s views as equally reasonable as those of people who do qualify.
Fair equality of opportunity, broadly construed to mean equal chances to develop the talents required 
not only to participate in society but also to survive and incorporate formative experiences, is a 
necessary condition for developing a personality and a grounded plan of life. Social justice as 
embodied in the two principles is, moreover, a necessary condition for not experiencing too many 
grounding experiences. Neither guarantees the presence of the required talents in the first place; Rawls 
seems to simply assume that they will be present at birth.
Rawls failed to overcome the oldest problem of liberalism - the problem that only an elite can enjoy 
the fruits of the liberal good life. This damages the degree of universalizability of his theory in two 
senses: it excludes those whose plans of life are not yet matured, and it may still exclude those who set 
less value on an examined life. Yet it is important to note that his elite is not an economic elite, as it 
used to be for classical liberals, i.e., an elite of financially independent burghers of mature age and of 
the male sexual persuasion. Nor is it an ennobled elite of the blood - it is, instead, an elite we can all 
hope to join in the course of our lives: an ‘aristocracy of all’ (Rawls 2000:211, literally quoting his 
favourite philosopher Kant).  Here again, Rawls consistently believes that the contingencies of fate 
should play no role. His, in this sense still egalitarian, elitism demands from us that we become 
human beings, truly moral beings facing the challenge of autonomy. It does not demand the 
impossible, i.e. that we become moral heroes - only, and this should appeal to every disciple of 
Aristotle, that we become whom we truly are. Unfortunately, that may not always be whom we want 
to be.
References
Barry, J.  and Wissenburg, M., eds. 2001.  Sustaining Liberal Democracy. London and New York: 
Palgrave.
Chambers, S. 2006.  ‘The Politics of Equality: Rawls on the Barricades’, Perspectives on Politics 
2006 (4/1), pp 81-89.
Cohen, G.A. 1995.  Self-Ownership, Freedom and equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daniels, N. 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Harvard Gazette, 25-11-2003, ‘John Rawls, influential political philosopher, dead at 81’, 
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2002/11.21/99-rawls.html, accessed 20-2-2003.
13
Kymlicka, W. 2000. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Nozick, R. 1989. The Examined Life. New York: Touchstone.
Rawls, John B. 1971.  A Theory of Justice. Second, revised edition (1999). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Rawls, John B. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, John B. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Rawls,  John B.  2000.  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Moral  Philosophy. Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard 
University Press.
Rogers, B. 1999. Portrait: John Rawls. http://www.stfx.ca/people/wsweet/Rawls-mag-article.htm, 
accessed 20-2-2003.
Wissenburg,  Marcel.  1999.  Imperfection and Impartiality.  London:  University  College of  London 
Press.
14
